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Hope is ubiquitous: family members express hope 
that we find love and happiness, politicians call for 
hope in response to tragedies, and optimists urge 
people to keep their hopes up. We also tell ourselves 
to maintain hope, to find it, or in darker moments, to 
give it up. We hope for frivolous things, too. 
But what is hope? Can hope be rational or irrational? 
Is hope valuable? Is it ever dangerous? 
This essay reviews recent important answers to 
these questions with the goal of better understanding 
hope.[1] 
1. What is Hope? 
The typical starting point for analyzing hope is that it 
involves a desire for an outcome and a belief that the 
outcome’s occurring is at least possible. The sense of 
possibility isn’t merely physical possibility, for we can 
hope that, say, God perform some miracle that 
violates the law of gravity. Philosophers tend to think 
that a person can hope for anything they believe is 
possible (no matter how low the odds), though it is a 
separate question whether a hope is rational or not, 
and to what degree.[2] 
But the belief-desire account of hope appears 
insufficient: we might desire an outcome, and believe 
that the outcome is possible, yet have absolutely no 
hope that it will happen![3] A prisoner facing 
execution may desire a pardon, believe that a pardon 
is possible, yet be altogether hopeless that he will be 
pardoned.[4] 
Hope, then, requires more than a desire for 
something and belief in its possibility. What else? 
Luc Bovens argues that hope also requires positive 
conscious thoughts or “mental imaging” about the 
desired outcome: basically, fantasizing about the 
desired outcome occurring.[5] The prisoner facing 
execution thus hopes for a pardon only if he has 
pleasant thoughts or imaginations about being 
pardoned. If hope involves, beyond belief and desire, 
pleasant thoughts about the outcome occurring, we 
might be able to distinguish being hopeful for 
something from being hopeless about it: hope 
involves pleasant thoughts whereas hopelessness 
involves unpleasant ones. 
Adrienne M. Martin questions whether Bovens’s view 
adequately distinguishes hope from hopelessness. 
She argues that a prisoner who is hopeless about the 
possibility of an overturned conviction may still 
desire the outcome, believe it possible, and fantasize 
about being pardoned.[6] To distinguish hope from 
hopelessness, Martin defends an “incorporation 
analysis” of hope:[7] the inmate incorporates his 
desire into his plans, believing that he has reasons to 
plan and act (e.g., with his lawyer) about the 
prospects of freedom. 
But does hope really require that hopeful people 
believe that they have reasons to feel, act, and plan in 
accordance with their desire, as Martin’s view 
requires? Michael Milona and Katie Stockdale argue 
that it does not.[8] We sometimes wholly reject our 
hopes (e.g., to return to a previous bad romantic 
relationship), believing that that we have no 
reason for what we hope for. Rejecting a hope, or 
believing that we should not have that hope, does not 
mean that this hope is any less of a hope, contrary to 
what the incorporation analysis suggests: hopes we 
wish we didn’t have are hopes nevertheless. 
Milona and Stockdale develop the idea that hope is 
akin not to a judgment, but rather, to a perceptual 
experience. Just as perceivers often judge their 
perceptions to be misguided (e.g., at magic shows), so 
too may hopers judge their hopes are misguided. 
Hope then involves, beyond belief and desire, a 
perceptual-like experience of reasons to pursue the 
desired outcome, or to prepare themselves for its 
possible occurrence. So, in hoping we may experience 
reasons to, say, return to an ex partner without 
believing such reasons exist. 
In sum, there continue to be significant debates about 
the nature of hope, most notably what needs to be 
added to hope (if anything) beyond mere belief and 
desire. 
2. The Rationality and Value of Hope 
Hope is generally thought to be epistemically rational 
if one’s belief about the possibility (or in some cases, 
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the specific likelihood) of the outcome is correct in 
light of the available evidence.[9] 
Hope may be practically rational in a variety of ways 
as well. Hope is thought to contribute to well-being, 
motivate the achievement of goals, and inspire 
courageous action, among other things.[10] 
Beyond epistemic and practical rationality, some 
hopes may even be rational because they are 
constitutive of who we are (e.g., a member of a 
certain religion), and to lose such fundamental hopes 
would be to lose part of our identity.[11] 
3. The Dangers of Hope 
Hope is not without risks. 
Thwarted hopes can result in strong feelings of 
disappointment. Hope may also be a source of 
wishful thinking, leading people to see the world as 
tilting in their favor despite the evidence.[12] For 
example, hope that the problems of climate change 
will be effectively addressed might lead someone not 
to bother with climate change activism or to take any 
personal responsibility to work to mitigate it. 
Hope can also be exploited, such as when politicians 
take advantage of the hopes of people in positions of 
powerlessness. For example, people who desperately 
hope for greater economic security may be 
influenced to accept policies that primarily serve the 
politician’s own ends rather than the people’s. 
These and other dangers of hope might lead us to 
explore alternative emotions to hope. Stockdale 
argues that in the face of persistent 
injustices, bitterness (i.e., anger without hope) might 
be a justified emotional response.[13] The relevance of 
hope to politics and society has also inspired 
investigation of whether hope is a democratic or 
political virtue[14] and whether a form of radical hope 
is needed in the face of cultural devastation and other 
severe hardships.[15] 
4. Conclusion 
In a world where our needs and desires are so often 
met with uncertainty, hope tends to emerge. 
Philosophy has much to contribute to understanding 
this phenomenon, and the potential value and risks of 
hope to all aspects of our lives: personally, socially, 
morally, intellectually, religiously, politically and 
more. 
 
 
Notes 
[1] Only recently have philosophers given the topic 
sustained attention.  Some discussions of hope are 
found in the philosophy of religion (see Augustine, c. 
420 [1999]), in existentialist writings (see Marcel, 
2010), and in bioethics (see, e.g., Simpson (2004); 
Murdoch and Scott (2010); McMillan, Walker, and 
Hope (2014)). 
[2] See Chignell (2014) for a discussion of Immanuel 
Kant’s defense of the rationality of hoping for 
miracles, divine grace, and a truly ethical society. 
[3] Despair has long been considered to be the attitude 
which is the opposite of hope. This view traces back 
to St. Thomas Aquinas who argues that despair is the 
contrary to hope insofar as it implies “withdrawal” 
from the desired object while hope implies 
“approach” (Summa Theologiae II-II.40.4). 
[4] The claim that the standard account fails to 
distinguish hope from hopelessness (or in his terms, 
despair) is due to Ariel Meirav (2009). 
[5] Bovens (1999). 
[6] Martin (2013, 18-19). 
[7] Moellendorf (2006) defends a similar theory. 
[8] Milona and Stockdale (2018). 
[9] Martin (2013, 37). 
[10] See Bovens (1999) and Kadlac (2015). 
[11] Blöser and Stahl (2017). 
[12] Bovens (1999). 
[13] Stockdale (2017). 
[14] See Moellendorf (2006) and Mittleman (2009). 
[15] Lear (2006). 
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